“Fast, structured, and highly actionable. SprintlyWorks gave us a clear view on where to play and how to win in private label spices across key European markets.”
The biggest market was the wrong market
A shelf full of jars with somebody else's name on them
Herbs and spices are a small category that behaves like a large one. A jar of oregano costs a few euros, weighs almost nothing, and sits on the shelf for a year. The margins are good, the volumes are modest, and the brand on the lid is very often the supermarket's own.
An 8 to 10 week sprint. One senior analyst and two juniors. Four national markets sized, ten retailers profiled, five suppliers assessed and twenty-eight shelf assortments catalogued product by product.
Our client is a Nordic food company with roughly 1.4 billion euros of turnover and an established branded position in its home markets. It wanted to know whether it could grow by supplying private label herbs and spices to retailers in Western Europe, where it has no shelf presence at all.
That is not a branding question. Private label supply is a business-to-business contract: a retailer specifies the product, the packaging and the price, and the supplier delivers volume against it. Winning one is a matter of production capability and cost, not marketing. Losing one is a matter of somebody already being there.
Four countries were on the table: Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Spain. The internal assumption, reasonable on its face, was that the largest market would be the best place to start.
The headline market size answers a question nobody asked
Every syndicated report will tell you what the herbs and spices market is worth in Germany. That number is the sum of everything sold, and the overwhelming majority of it is branded product made by companies that are not going to hand over their contracts.
A private label supplier cannot sell into the branded share of the market. Sizing the total and then hoping is the most common way this analysis goes wrong.
So the useful number is not the market. It is the private label segment of the market, in value, with its own growth rate, in each country separately. Those splits exist but they have to be assembled, and once assembled they reorder the countries completely.
There is a second difficulty. Private label supply contracts are private. There is no register of who makes a supermarket's own-brand paprika. The answer has to be built from packaging codes, corporate filings, plant locations and the knowledge of people who work in the trade, and it comes out as a well evidenced inference rather than a fact.
The third is that price is the whole negotiation. A retailer will tell a prospective supplier what it pays only at the end of a long courtship. Getting to a defensible price before the first meeting means reading it off the shelf: every product, every pack format, in every relevant chain, converted to a comparable euros per kilogram.
Four countries, ten retailers, twenty-eight assortments
What was deliberately not done. No interviews with the target retailers. Approaching a buyer before the client had confirmed it could meet the volume would have burned the introduction. The entire analysis is built from published and observable evidence for that reason.
Size the private label segment, not the market
Total category value and volume for each country from syndicated data, then split by brand and private label, with separate historic and forward growth rates for each half.
Walk the shelf
Twenty-eight complete product assortments catalogued, covering the leading brand and every private label range in each of the four countries. Product count, category coverage, pack format and shelf price for each.
Convert every shelf price to euros per kilogram
Pack sizes differ by chain and by product. Without normalising, a small glass jar and a refill sachet are not comparable and the price analysis is decorative.
Identify the incumbent supplier behind each private label
Five manufacturers assessed on scale, financial strength, geographic footprint and which own-brand ranges they are understood to supply.
Score ten retailers on volume, pricing and accessibility
Volume required per year in tonnes and in units, median achievable price, strength of the incumbent, and anything in the retailer's own published strategy that would help or hinder a new supplier.
The biggest market is the one you should enter last
Germany is the largest herbs and spices market of the four by a wide margin, worth 889 million euros in 2023 against 443 million for the United Kingdom. It also has the highest consumption per head, tied with Spain at 0.19 kilograms a year. On every headline measure it looks like the obvious place to begin.
The four markets, on the numbers that were used to rank them
Category value and volume, 2023, with historic and forward growth
| Country | Value 2023 | Value CAGR 2018 to 2023 | Value 2028 | Value CAGR 2023 to 2028 | Volume 2023 | Consumption per head |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | €889m | 5.2% | €1,056m | 3.5% | 15.7kt | 0.19kg |
| United Kingdom | €443m | 4.5% | €539m | 4.0% | 5.6kt | 0.08kg |
| France | €369m | 2.9% | €438m | 3.5% | 5.7kt | 0.09kg |
| Spain | €254m | 4.4% | €337m | 5.8% | 9.1kt | 0.19kg |
Euromonitor, with SprintlyWorks analysis. Forward figures to 2028 are the published forecast, not our estimate.
Read on its own, this table says start in Germany. It is more than twice the size of the next market and it grows at a respectable rate. That was the client's working assumption and it is the wrong conclusion.
Consumption per head is worth pausing on, because it cuts the other way from the market size. The United Kingdom consumes 0.08 kilograms a head, less than half the German and Spanish figure, on a population of similar order. That is not a reason to avoid the country. It is a reason to expect the value to sit in price rather than volume, which turned out to be exactly right.
Split the market in two and the order reverses
Once each market is divided into its branded and private label halves, the ranking that mattered to the client inverts. Germany is 89 per cent branded. The United Kingdom and Spain are two thirds private label.
The same four markets, split by brand and private label
Share of category value, 2023, with each half's own growth rate
Euromonitor, with SprintlyWorks analysis.
Private label growth 2018 to 2023: Germany 8.8%, United Kingdom 4.6%, Spain 6.7%, France 2.9%. Branded growth over the same period: Germany 4.8%, United Kingdom 2.4%, Spain 2.0%, France 2.9%.
Germany is the best market to be in five years from now and the worst of the three to enter first. Those are different questions and the client had been treating them as one.
In value terms the private label segment is worth 292 million euros in the United Kingdom, 167 million in Spain, 98 million in Germany and 69 million in France. The market our client was preparing to enter first is the third largest of the four.
Private label segment, by size
The number that decides where to start, EUR million, 2023
Euromonitor, with SprintlyWorks analysis.
Germany is the largest category and the third largest opportunity. The United Kingdom is half the size of Germany overall and three times the size of it where our client could actually sell.
The German figure carries a genuine counter-argument and it should be stated. German private label is growing at 8.8 per cent a year, the fastest of the four and nearly double the branded rate in the same country. On a long enough horizon it becomes a serious market. But it is growing quickly from 98 million euros, and a supplier with finite capacity has to choose where to put the first contract.
France was set aside on the evidence rather than on preference. Its category grows more slowly than any of the others at 2.9 per cent, its private label share is small at 19 per cent, and one branded manufacturer holds more than half the market. A new private label supplier entering France would be competing for a small segment inside a slow market against an entrenched incumbent with pricing power.
Five manufacturers already hold the shelf
Private label supply is not an empty field. Five manufacturers account for the bulk of own-brand herbs and spices across the four countries, and each of the three attractive markets is dominated by a different one.
How this was established. Supply relationships between manufacturers and retailers are not published. Each attribution rests on packaging evidence, corporate filings, plant footprint and trade knowledge, and is stated as a well evidenced inference rather than as a confirmed contract.
Germany: the largest European manufacturer
It supplies a substantial share of German own-brand ranges and owns several of the leading brands alongside them. Scale and incumbency both work against a new entrant here.
United Kingdom: the largest British retail supplier
Strong across British own-brand ranges, but a considerably smaller company than the global players. This is the most exposed incumbent position of the three.
Spain: the largest Spanish manufacturer
It supplies multiple own-brand ranges and runs a popular brand of its own, which gives it both volume and a reason to defend.
Everywhere: the largest spice manufacturer in the world
Present in all four countries through owned brands and supplied own-brand ranges. Its branded products have been performing poorly, which means it has both the margin and the motive to cut price against a new entrant.
A low-price specialist
Financially sound, present in every relevant channel, and priced at the bottom of the market. It sets the floor that any entry price has to clear.
The British incumbent is the weakest of the three national positions, and it happens to sit in front of the largest private label segment. That is the single most useful sentence in the study.
Six retailers worth a call, and the terms each would set
Ten retailers were profiled across the three markets that survived. Six came through as realistic first approaches, and they are deliberately spread so that the client has an alternative in each country if the first conversation fails on volume or on price.
The ten retailers, and what each one would demand
Assessed on the four things that decide whether a supply contract is winnable
| Theme | Service | Volume within reach | Price achievable | Incumbent displaceable | Strategy favours a new supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Premium grocer, upper-end range | ● | ● | ● | ● |
| Full-range supermarket, no branded competition on shelf | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| Largest chain, branded and own-brand side by side | · | ● | · | · | |
| Fastest growing chain, wide branded range | · | ● | · | · | |
| Germany | Discounter, own-brand only | ● | · | · | ● |
| Full-range retailer, narrow own-brand range | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| Second discounter, two own-brands at two price points | ● | · | · | · | |
| Spain | Hypermarket group, wide own-brand assortment | ● | ● | ● | · |
| Regional cooperative, balanced brand and own-brand | ● | ● | ● | ● | |
| Largest grocer in the country | · | ● | · | · | |
| Services offered | 7 | 8 | 5 | 5 |
SprintlyWorks analysis of published retailer strategy, shelf assortment and client volume estimates.
The largest Spanish grocer scores well on every commercial measure and is excluded anyway. Its volume requirement is far beyond what the client could commit to in a first contract, and a supply agreement that cannot be fulfilled is worse than no agreement.
Two of the six would each require more than 200 tonnes a year, at roughly 9 and 10 million individual units. That is the number the client had to check against its own factory before anything else happened, and it is the reason the study ends with a capability question rather than a pitch.
Price is the other constraint and it is not uniform. The German discounter runs the lowest median spice price of any retailer assessed, at 15.6 euros per kilogram. The Spanish cooperative and the Spanish hypermarket group both sit at a median herb price near 49 euros per kilogram. A supplier that can meet one of those numbers cannot necessarily meet the other, and the study says so rather than averaging them.
The German full-range retailer carries a distribution complication that the others do not. It runs more than 12,000 store locations, which implies tens of distribution centres, and supplying it is a logistics undertaking before it is a manufacturing one.
Start in the United Kingdom, keep Spain warm, come to Germany later
The recommendation was an order of entry rather than a single target, because the constraint was never which market was attractive. It was how much volume the client could commit to at once.
The client asked which market was biggest. The answer that mattered was which market was available, and those turned out to be different countries.
Approach the United Kingdom first
Largest private label segment of the four at 292 million euros, two thirds of the category, and the weakest incumbent supplier position. Two retailers were named as first approaches, one premium and one full-range, so that a failure on volume at either does not end the country.
Hold Spain as the second market, not the fallback
Second largest private label segment at 167 million euros and the fastest growing category overall at 5.8 per cent to 2028. Two retailers named, both at accessible volumes. The largest Spanish grocer is deliberately excluded on volume.
Treat Germany as a later entry, and watch the private label rate
Smallest available segment of the three at 98 million euros but the fastest private label growth at 8.8 per cent. Two retailers named for when the client has the capacity to serve them.
Do not enter France
Slowest growth, smallest private label share, and one branded manufacturer holding more than half the market. There is no version of this where France is the right first move.
Four conditions were attached to the recommendation, and all four are internal rather than commercial. Production capability at the volumes required. Packaging capability against retailer-specified formats. A cost base that clears the achievable price in the specific chain being approached. And supply chain reach into the retailer's distribution network. Each was written against the named retailers rather than in general, so the client could test them one at a time.
What this study could not settle
Whether the client can actually make the volume
Every volume figure is what the retailer would require. Whether the client's plants can produce and pack it was outside the scope and is the first thing that has to be answered internally.
What the retailer actually pays its current supplier
Prices here are read off the shelf and converted to euros per kilogram. The wholesale price is a negotiated number that no retailer publishes, and the gap between the two is the supplier's margin plus the retailer's.
How long the incumbent contracts run
Own-brand supply agreements can be long. Two of the six shortlisted retailers publish supplier partnership or local sourcing commitments in their own strategy, which suggests incumbency is defended, but the contract terms are not public.
What the regulatory cost of the United Kingdom is
Labelling, packaging, traceability and food safety requirements diverge from the European Union rules the client already meets. The divergence was identified as a cost to be quantified, not quantified.
How the incumbents would respond
The largest global manufacturer has weak branded performance and healthy margins, which is the profile of a company that can cut price against a new entrant. That this is possible is established. That it would happen is not.
What the numbers rest on
| Layer | What it provided | Principal sources |
|---|---|---|
| Market sizing | Category value and volume by country, 2018 to 2023, with the 2028 forecast | Euromonitor; national trade statistics |
| Brand and private label split | Share of value and separate growth rates for each half, by country | Euromonitor; SprintlyWorks analysis |
| Shelf audit | Twenty-eight complete product assortments: product count, category coverage, pack format and shelf price, converted to euros per kilogram | Retailer online assortments and in-store observation, audited in 2023 and 2024 |
| Retailer profiles | Ten retailers on market share, own-brand strategy, volume requirement and published strategic priorities | Kantar; IGD; retailer annual reports; client volume estimates |
| Supplier assessment | Five manufacturers on scale, financial strength, geographic footprint and inferred own-brand supply relationships | LSEG; Orbis; company filings; packaging evidence; SprintlyWorks analysis |
| Cost modelling | Simulated retailer purchase price and implied production cost headroom by chain | SprintlyWorks model, built on client-supplied cost assumptions and audited shelf prices |
Volume and unit requirements per retailer are estimates built with the client, not figures supplied by the retailers.
Every ranking on this page can be rebuilt from the market table in the first finding and the brand and private label split in the second. Where a figure is a model output rather than a measurement, it says so on the exhibit where it appears.
On anonymity. The client is not named. Neither are the ten retailers profiled, the six recommended as approaches, nor the five manufacturers assessed as incumbents. Six of those retailers were identified as targets for a commercial approach the client had not yet made: naming them would disclose the client's intentions and hand the incumbents a warning. Countries and every figure are given in full.
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